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This study seeks to answer the following social science research question: what drives 
China’s conventional arms transfers to sub-Saharan African countries?  It hypothesizes that the 
arms sales are motivated less by economic considerations and more by strategic considerations.  
To test the hypothesis, this study utilizes a comparative case study analysis of Sudan, Nigeria, 
and Angola to look for economic and strategic considerations for arms transfers.  By examining 
the prevalence of each consideration in the cases, the study can draw broader conclusions as to 
whether China is primarily motivated by economic or strategic reasons. 
The study finds that both economic and strategic considerations are present in the cases. 
Issues with data prevent this paper from drawing definitive conclusions about China’s arms 
transfers to sub-Saharan Africa.  However, the preponderance of available data indicates that 
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In recent years, the People’s Republic of China (hereafter referred to as “China” or the 
“PRC”) has increased its economic engagement in Africa in large part to advance its ‘Going Out’ 
policy and Belt and Road Initiative.  Simultaneously, it has expanded its military and political 
engagement on the continent and facilitated the first-ever China-Africa Peace and Security 
Forum. One aspect of China’s engagement in Africa has been through arms transfers.  The 
country has grown to become the third-largest supplier of weapons to African nations, behind 
Russia and the United States.  This research will examine the motivations behind Chinese arms 
sales to sub-Saharan Africa.  It will consider the following social science research question: 
“What drives China’s conventional arms transfers to sub-Saharan African countries?”  This 
paper hypothesizes that the arms sales are motivated less by economic considerations and more 
by strategic considerations. 
This research is important for both strategic and scientific reasons.  First, countering 
global power competition from China is a principle security interest of the United States, as 
outlined in the 2021 Interim National Security Strategic Guidance.  One arena in which China is 
competing with the United States and attempting to influence the current international order is on 
the African continent.  Knowing the motivations behind Chinese arms transfers to the region will 
allow US policymakers to develop appropriate policies in response.  Additionally, there are 
conflicting explanations in academia about China’s intentions with its arms transfers to the 
region.  Several scholars argue that economic considerations such as profit are the motive behind 
these arms sales.  Others contend that Chinese political and military objectives drive this activity.  
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Therefore, this research can contribute to the existing scholarship on the subject by validating 
one theory over others. 
North Africa is commonly considered the more strategically significant part of the 
African continent.  However, sub-Saharan Africa is increasing in its importance to the United 
States, China, and other world powers.  The two regions are often associated with different 
identities, given their vast cultural and language differences.  Therefore, generalizations of one 
region may not apply to the other.  As such, this study will focus its research on sub-Saharan 
Africa.  It will utilize a comparative case study analysis to examine and compare the motivations 
behind Chinese arms dealing in Sudan, Nigeria, and Angola. These countries represent the three 
largest receivers of Chinese weapons in sub-Saharan Africa from 2016 through 2020.1  It will 
predominantly use qualitative data, although there will be intermittent usage of quantitative data 
when addressing specific numbers of weapons sales, exports, and related numerical information.  
The research will acquire data from existing databases, primary and secondary documentation, 
archives, contemporary journalism, government and NGO publications, and official press 
releases.   
 This paper will use the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s 
(SIPRI) definition of “arms transfers,” which includes “all international sales and gifts of 
weapons, including manufacturing licenses.”2  The type of arms discussed in this paper only 
refers to “conventional” arms.  This research will use the International Peace Bureau's definition 
of “conventional” arms, which are “weapons that are not weapons of mass destruction.”3 They 
 
1 “SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.” SIPRI. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Accessed June 18, 
2021. https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers. 
2 “SIPRI Arms Transfers Database - Methodology.” SIPRI. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. 
Accessed June 5, 2021. https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers/background. 
3 “Conventional Weapons: IPB - International Peace Bureau.” IPB. International Peace Bureau. Accessed June 14, 
2021. https://www.ipb.org/conventional-weapons/. 
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include, but are not limited to, “armored combat vehicles, combat helicopters, combat aircraft, 
warships, small arms and light weapons, landmines, cluster munitions, ammunition, and 
artillery.”4  This research will use the following definition of small arms and light weapons from 
the United Nations: “any man-portable lethal weapon that expels or launches, is designed to 
expel or launch, or may be readily converted to expel or launch a shot, bullet or projectile by the 
action of an explosive, excluding antique small arms and light weapons or their replicas.”5 
The term “arms transfers” is used interchangeably with the terms “arms sales,” “arms 
dealing,” and “weapons transfers,” as well as their various forms. 
 
Literature Review 
For decades, countries including the United States, France, Germany, and Russia have 
engaged in international arms sales to nations and other non-state actors for various reasons.   In 
the 1980s, China became an arms dealer on the global stage, where it successfully sold to 
developing countries that favored its low-cost weapons.6  Despite the prevalence of arms dealing 
among developing and developed countries alike, weapons transfers are often a contentious and 
debated topic given their link to violent conflicts. With the growth of the international arms trade 
in recent decades, researchers have conducted a significant body of scholarship on key 
motivations of countries for selling weapons.   
Why Countries Sells Arms Internationally 
 
4 “Conventional Weapons: IPB - International Peace Bureau.” IPB. International Peace Bureau. Accessed June 14, 
2021. https://www.ipb.org/conventional-weapons/. 
5 United Nations. In International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable 
Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons: Draft Decision. New York: UN, 2005. 
6 Byman, Daniel and Roger Cliff, China’s Arms Sales: Motivations and Implications. Santa Monica, CA: RAND 
Corporation, 1999. https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1119.html. 
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There are various reasons why nations engage in the international arms trade.  Existing 
literature suggests that countries sell weapons abroad for two primary motivations: economic or 
strategic purposes.   This literature review identifies and examines six specific reasons, classified 
as “considerations” in this study, that make up these primary motivations.  It also gives examples 
of how various countries have applied these motivations.  It then highlights the potential 
shortcomings of the existing scholarship. 
Economic Considerations for Arms Transfers 
Figure 1: Summary of Economic Considerations for Arms Transfers 
 
The first general theory for why countries engage in international arms sales is that it is 
for economic considerations.  This section details three economic considerations. 
To Create Profit for Supplying Country 
The first potential aspect of a country’s economic motivation for arms sales is the desire 
for profit.  According to Rachel Stohl, arms trading, including small arms and light weapons, is a 
profitable venture.7  In 2017, the SIPRI concluded that the global arms trade was worth a 
minimum of $95 billion.8  However, they considered that number conservative due to the 
relatively limited amount of data on many types of arms exports.  According to Amnesty 
 
7 Stohl, Rachel. “Understanding the Conventional Arms Trade.” AIP Publishing. AIP Publishing LLC AIP 
Publishing, November 15, 2017. https://aip.scitation.org/doi/abs/10.1063/1.5009220. 
8 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. “Financial Value of the Global Arms Trade.” SIPRI. Accessed 
June 22, 2021. https://www.sipri.org/databases/financial-value-global-arms-trade. 
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International, the world’s top 100 largest arms companies generated 398.2 billion in profit in 
2017.9   
Research by Andrew Pierre likewise found that countries may sell weapons because the 
exports earn foreign exchange and contribute to their balance of payments.10   For instance, in a 
comprehensive study of US weapons sales, Michael Klare found that arms sales helped reduce 
its balance-of-payments deficit.11  They may also contribute to profit by enabling the supplying 
country to create economies of scale.12   
To Encourage the Sharing of Non-Military Goods and Services 
Another consideration that may influence a country’s economic motivation for selling 
arms is that it encourages both the supplying and receiving countries to share non-military goods 
and services.13  According to Christian Catrina, “cooperative government-to-government 
relations established by arms transfers may lead the recipient to place an additional part of its 
non-military orders with the same supplier.”14 
A key aspect of using arms sales to encourage the sharing of non-military goods and 
services is for the supplying country to secure resources.15  According to Catrina, certain arms 
sales are “barter agreements of highly specified offset arrangements” that involve selling 
 
9 Amnesty International. “Killer Facts 2019: The Scale of the Global Arms Trade.” Killer facts: The scale of the 
global arms trade | Amnesty International. Amnesty International, August 23, 2019. 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/08/killer-facts-2019-the-scale-of-the-global-arms-trade/. 
10 Pierre, Andrew J. The Global Politics of Arms Sales. Course Book ed., Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2014. muse.jhu.edu/book/33580 
11 Klare, Michael T. "Political Economy of U.S. Arms Sales." Social Scientist 4, no. 11 (1976): 3-19. Accessed June 
22, 2021. doi:10.2307/3516195. 
12 Pierre, Andrew J. The Global Politics of Arms Sales. Course Book ed., Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2014. muse.jhu.edu/book/33580 
13 Marcovitz, Dan. The Arms Trade. Philadelphia, PA: National Highlights Inc., 2016. Accessed June 13, 2021. 
ProQuest Ebook Central. 
14 Catrina, Christian. Arms Transfers and Dependence. Geneva: UNIDIR, 1988. 
15 Ibid. 
   
 
 6 
weapons for a particular supply of sources.16  This desire to secure resources particularly applies 
to raw materials that the supplying country cannot produce domestically.17 
To Create Employment Opportunities for Supplying Country 
The third potential aspect of a country’s economic motivations for selling arms is that it 
could lead to employment opportunities for the supplying country.18  Various industries directly 
benefit from the global arms trade.  For instance, Klare’s research found that the US sold 
weapons in part to “ensure full production (and thus full employment) in the aerospace 
industry.”19  Other industries indirectly benefit.  For instance, Pierre highlights the “multiplier 
impact of jobs in one industry upon those in another.”20  
 
Strategic Considerations for Arms Transfers 
Figure 2: Summary of Strategic Considerations for Arms Transfers 
 
 The second predominant theory for why countries export weapons is that they do it for 
strategic reasons.  Keren Yarhi-Milo, Alexander Lanoszka, and Zack Cooper conducted research 
that examined the reasons for great powers engaging in arms transfers and found “weak 
 
16 Catrina, Christian. Arms Transfers and Dependence. Geneva: UNIDIR, 1988. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Pierre, Andrew J. The Global Politics of Arms Sales. Course Book ed., Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2014. muse.jhu.edu/book/33580 
19 Klare, Michael T. "Political Economy of U.S. Arms Sales." Social Scientist 4, no. 11 (1976): 3-19. Accessed June 
22, 2021. doi:10.2307/3516195. 
20 Pierre, Andrew J. The Global Politics of Arms Sales. Course Book ed., Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2014. muse.jhu.edu/book/33580 
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evidence” that commercial interests drove the sales.21  Instead, they determined that countries 
primarily sell arms for “strategic” reasons rather than economic considerations.22  This section 
details three strategic considerations. 
To Create Influence with Recipient Nation 
Countries may sell weapons because they can create influence with the recipient nation.23  
Among other reasons, this occurs because countries purchasing weapons often become 
dependent on the exporting country to supply arms and provide knowledge of their operations.  
For instance, receiving countries may require additional supplies.  Thus, it is advantageous to 
maintain a relationship with the selling country.24  Klare found that “leverage accrues” due to 
many major weapons systems requiring “spare parts, training aids, and maintenance” only 
attainable from the original supplier.25  This leverage creates a long-term dependent relationship 
between the supplying and receiving countries.26 
It also enables the supplying country to gain leverage over the recipient countries' foreign 
policy decisions.27  For instance, the US utilized arms sales to “try to encourage states to vote 
with the United States at the UN, to support or adopt pro-Western and pro-US foreign policies, to 
convince Egypt and Israel to accept peace accords.”28  Arms sales create influence by allowing 
 
21 Yarhi-Milo, Keren, Alexander Lanoszka, and Zack Cooper. “To Arm or to Ally? The Patron's Dilemma and the 
Strategic Logic of Arms Transfers and Alliances.” International Security 41, no. 2 (2016): 90–139. 
https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00250. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Pierre, Andrew J. The Global Politics of Arms Sales. Course Book ed., Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2014. muse.jhu.edu/book/33580 
24 Marcovitz, Dan. The Arms Trade. Philadelphia, PA: National Highlights Inc., 2016. Accessed June 13, 2021. 
ProQuest Ebook Central. 
25 Klare, Michael T. "Political Economy of U.S. Arms Sales." Social Scientist 4, no. 11 (1976): 3-19. Accessed June 
22, 2021. doi:10.2307/3516195. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Pierre, Andrew J. The Global Politics of Arms Sales. Course Book ed., Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2014. muse.jhu.edu/book/33580 
28 Thrall, Trevor, and Caroline Dorminey. “Risky Business: The Role of Arms Sales in U.S. Foreign Policy.” 
cato.org. CATO Institute, March 13, 2018. https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/risky-business-role-arms-sales-us-
foreign-policy#the-case-for-arms-sales. 
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the supplying country to determine conditionality for the sale of the weapons.29  However, this 
theory does not always prove successful in practice.  For instance, William D. Hartung and Seth 
Binder examined the effectiveness of US security aid to Egypt. They found that “unconditional 
US military aid has not only failed to influence Egypt’s domestic policy, it has also failed to 
influence Egypt’s foreign policy to better align with US interests.”30 
Arms sales also help the supplying country increase influence by allowing it to gain 
access to political and military elites.31  As Klare notes, this is particularly applicable in third-
world countries, where foreign military leaders often play key roles in national politics.32  Given 
the influential nature of arms sales, the relationships between the supplying country and the elites 
can be long-lasting, resulting in “significant political advantages” and future sales.33 
Creating influence allows the supplying country to compete with other nations.  For 
instance, in Africa, Raska and Bitzinger argue that China attempts to compete with Russian 
markets while countering Western influence in the region.34   
To Assist Allies and Partners 
Countries may use weapons sales and other military assistance to help political and 
ideological partners protect themselves.35  As Klare notes, governments can use arms transfers to 
 
29 Thrall, Trevor, and Caroline Dorminey. “Risky Business: The Role of Arms Sales in U.S. Foreign Policy.” 
cato.org. CATO Institute, March 13, 2018. https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/risky-business-role-arms-sales-us-
foreign-policy#the-case-for-arms-sales. 
30 Hartung, William D, and Seth Binder. “Report – U.S. Security Assistance to Egypt: Examining the Return on 
Investment.” POMED. Project on Middle East Democracy. Accessed June 16, 2021. https://pomed.org/report-u-s-
security-assistance-to-egypt-examining-the-return-on-investment/. 
31 Pierre, Andrew J. The Global Politics of Arms Sales. Course Book ed., Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2014. muse.jhu.edu/book/33580 
32 Klare, Michael T. "Political Economy of U.S. Arms Sales." Social Scientist 4, no. 11 (1976): 3-19. Accessed June 
22, 2021. doi:10.2307/3516195. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Raska, Michael, and Richard A Bitzinger. “China as an Arms Exporter: The Strategic Contours of China’s Arms 
Transfers.” Law and the Arms Trade, 2020. https://doi.org/10.5040/9781509922321.ch-011. 
35 Gates, Robert M. "Helping Others Defend Themselves: The Future of U.S. Security Assistance." Foreign Affairs 
89, no. 3 (2010): 2-6. Accessed June 16, 2021. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25680910. 
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aid regimes favored by the supplying country.36 According to Stephanie Neuman and Robert 
Harkavy, selling weapons is “economically less burdensome and politically less sensitive than 
stationing troops abroad.”37  Former US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates posited that countries 
might not wish to enter into long-term engagements like that seen in the War on Terror.38  
Military assistance, therefore, can allow the supplying country to help its partners without having 
to take a direct role in the conflict.39   
One of the earliest examples of this, and one that Gates notes, was the American Lend-
Lease Act in 1941.  Signed by Roosevelt, the policy enabled the United States to supply various 
allied countries with weapons and other supplies to fight the Axis powers.  It allowed the US to 
provide security to its allies and partners without committing troops.  Taiwan, likewise, has 
regularly utilized this “arms-for-troops substitution” to assist its allies without stationing troops 
overseas.40 
A central component of assisting allies through arms sales is that the weapons may deter 
adversaries.41  For instance, the United States repeatedly sold weapons to the governments of 
Iraq and Afghanistan throughout the War on Terror to combat Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other 
terrorist groups.42 
To Establish Security Facilities in Recipient Country 
 
36 Klare, Michael T. "Political Economy of U.S. Arms Sales." Social Scientist 4, no. 11 (1976): 3-19. Accessed June 
22, 2021. doi:10.2307/3516195. 
37 Neuman, Stephanie G., and Robert E Harkavy. Arms Transfers In the Modern World. New York: Praeger, 1979. 
38 Gates, Robert M. "Helping Others Defend Themselves: The Future of U.S. Security Assistance." Foreign Affairs 
89, no. 3 (2010): 2-6. Accessed June 16, 2021. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25680910. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Thrall, Trevor, and Caroline Dorminey. “Risky Business: The Role of Arms Sales in U.S. Foreign Policy.” 
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Arms transfers may allow the supplying country to establish military bases and 
intelligence facilities in the recipient country.43  According to Neuman and Harkavy, arms sales 
are a “major instrument in the global competition for acquiring and maintaining strategic military 
access.”44  Governments can use this access for training, staging of arms and personnel, naval 
repair, shore leave, and other overt applications.45  Likewise, countries can use this access for 
reconnaissance and intelligence activities.46  The United States, for instance, has utilized arms 
sales to gain access to military bases in countries throughout Europe, Africa, Asia, and the 
Middle East.47   
 
Limitations of Existing Research 
One shortcoming of the existing scholarship is that data on arms sales are potentially 
unreliable.  The SIPRI, for instance, notes that “published trade figures [on country’s arms sales] 
are inadequate, and . . . are rarely comprehensive.”48  Thus, figures utilized in many of these 
books could be underrepresented.  Furthermore, SIPRI data, which much of the examined 
literature cites, only includes what it considers to be “major” weapons, such as aircraft, air 
defense systems, artillery, missiles, and ships.49  It does not cover “military equipment such as 
small arms and light weapons other than portable guided missiles such as man-portable air 
 
43 Pierre, Andrew J. The Global Politics of Arms Sales. Course Book ed., Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2014. muse.jhu.edu/book/33580 
44 Neuman, Stephanie G., and Robert E Harkavy. Arms Transfers In the Modern World. New York: Praeger, 1979. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Thrall, Trevor, and Caroline Dorminey. “Risky Business: The Role of Arms Sales in U.S. Foreign Policy.” 
cato.org. CATO Institute, March 13, 2018. https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/risky-business-role-arms-sales-us-
foreign-policy#the-case-for-arms-sales. 
48 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. The Arms Trade with the Third World. Harmondsworth 
Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1975. 
49 “Sources and Methods.” SIPRI. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Accessed June 7, 2021. 
https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers/sources-and-methods. 
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defense systems (MANPADS) and guided anti-tank missiles.”50  Thus, countries that export 
large shares of small arms and light weapons (like China) may have their information 
inadequately represented in these readings.51   
Another potential limitation of the existing scholarship is that the sources are 
predominantly of Western origin.  Without native knowledge of the Chinese language, this paper 
was only able to examine literature written in English.  Similarly, a large portion of the 
scholarship from the literature review uses the United States as a case study.  While many 
themes may apply universally, some of the analyses might only pertain to the US and not other 
countries like China.  
 
Hypothesis 
This research will use a comparative case study analysis to determine China’s primary 
motivation for selling weapons to sub-Saharan African countries.  It will test the following 
hypothesis:  
H: China’s arms sales to sub-Saharan African countries are motivated less by economic 
considerations and more by strategic considerations. 
 
If China is primarily motivated to sell weapons to sub-Saharan African countries for strategic 
purposes, the cases should show more significant evidence of strategic considerations rather than 
economic considerations. 
 
50 “Sources and Methods.” SIPRI. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Accessed June 7, 2021. 
https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers/sources-and-methods. 
51 Thrall, Lloyd. "Chinese Presence and Behavior in Africa." In China’s Expanding African Relations: Implications 
for U.S. National Security, 21-74. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 2015. Accessed June 7, 2021. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/j.ctt15zc655.10. 




This study will utilize a comparative case study analysis to examine and compare the 
motivations behind Chinese arms dealing in Sudan, Nigeria, and Angola.  This paper selected 
these countries because they represent the three largest receivers of Chinese weapons in sub-
Saharan Africa over the last five years (2016 to 2020).52  Additionally, the countries have long 
histories of engaging with China on security and economic issues. As such, there is a large 
volume of data available to conduct a comparative case study analysis.   
These case studies will evaluate the weapons imports from China into Sudan, Nigeria, 
and Angola to look for the presence of economic and strategic considerations for arms transfers.  
These considerations, introduced in the literature review, are re-shown in Figure 3.  It is 
important to note that a country can be motivated to sell arms for both economic and strategic 
reasons.  By examining the prevalence of each consideration in the cases, this study will draw 
broader conclusions as to whether China is primarily motivated by economic or strategic 
reasons.   
Figure 3: Summary of Economic Considerations for Arms Transfers 
 
 
52 “SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.” SIPRI. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Accessed June 18, 
2021. https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers. 
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 This research will exploit primary and secondary documentation, archives, contemporary 
journalism, government and NGO publications, and official press releases to look for economic 
and strategic considerations in the cases.  Suppose this assessment finds a correlation between 
China’s arms sales and the two countries signing an economic or strategic agreement.  In that 
case, this will indicate that there are economic or strategic considerations present. 
This paper will use quantitative data from SIPRI when addressing specific numbers of 
weapons sales, exports, and other numerical information.  SIPRI measures data through trend-
indicator value (TIV), a unit representing the “transfer of military resources rather than the 
financial value of the transfer.”53  They do not represent actual sale prices of the weapons 
transfers, but rather “raw data for calculating trends in international arms transfers over periods 
of time, global percentages for suppliers and recipients, and percentages for the volume of 
transfers to or from particular states.”54 
The TIV data only includes what the SIPRI considers to be “major weapons,” such as 
aircraft, missiles, sensors, ships, and artillery.  It does not include small arms and light weapons.  
SIPRI acquired this data from a variety of open sources, including but not limited to: 
newspapers, television broadcasts, and government publications.55  For additional information, 





53 “SIPRI Arms Transfers Database - Methodology.” SIPRI. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. 
Accessed June 5, 2021. https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers/background. 
54 Ibid. 
55 “SIPRI Arms Transfers Database - Methodology.” SIPRI. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. 
Accessed June 5, 2021. https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers/background. 
56 Ibid. 




This data section will begin by giving a brief overview of broader Chinese arms transfers 
to Africa.  It will then provide an overview of the arms sales from China to Sudan, Nigeria, and 
Angola.  Finally, it will examine each of the economic and strategic considerations in the context 
of these three cases. 
Overview of China’s Arms Transfers to Africa 
Due to its growing political influence and more recent rise as a major arms exporter, 
scholars have paid increasing attention to the PRC’s arms sales, of which 16 percent went to the 
continent of Africa.57   From 2016-2020, China ranked as the world’s fifth-largest arms exporter, 
accounting for 5.2 percent of the global share of arms sales.58  According to the SIPRI, China’s 
arms exports declined by 7.8 percent from 2016 to 2020.59  However, this recent decline in sales 
accompanied a 16 percent decrease in total global arms sales in part due to the Covid-19 
pandemic.60  Moreover, this followed a 77 percent increase in China’s weapons exports between 
2006–2010 and 2011–2015.61  
Overview of China’s Arms Transfers to Sudan 
From 2016-2020, China was the largest seller of weapons to Sudan, accounting for 41.7 
percent of the total market share.62  It exported 96 million of the 230 million TIVs of arms to the 
 
57  Wezeman, Pieter D, Alexandra Kuimova, and Siemon T Wezeman. “Trends in International Arms Transfers, 




60 “How Dominant Is China in the Global Arms Trade?” ChinaPower Project, May 27, 2021. 
https://chinapower.csis.org/china-global-arms-trade/. 
61 Wezeman, Pieter D, Alexandra Kuimova, and Siemon T Wezeman. “Trends in International Arms Transfers, 
2020.” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2021. https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2021-
03/fs_2103_at_2020_v2.pdf. 
62 “SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.” SIPRI. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Accessed June 18, 
2021. https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers. 
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country.63  The next largest suppliers were Russia (75 million TIVs) and Belarus (59 million 
TIVs).64  Figure 4 shows the trade register of the Chinese sales over these five years. 
Figure 4: Trade Register of China-Sudan Arms Sales (2016-2020)65  
 
Overview of China’s Arms Transfers to Nigeria 
From 2016-2020, China was the second-largest seller of weapons to Nigeria, behind 
Russia.66  It exported 93 million of the 283 million TIVs of arms to the country, accounting for 
32.8 percent of the total market share.67  Figure 5 shows the trade register of the Chinese sales 
over these five years. 
Figure 5: Trade Register of China-Nigeria Arms Sales (2016-2020)68 
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 From 2016-2020, China was the second-largest seller of weapons to Angola, behind 
Russia.69  China exported 72 million of the 745 million TIVs of arms to the country, accounting 
for 9.7 percent of the total market share.70  Figure 6 shows the trade register of the Chinese sales 
over these five years. 
Figure 6: Trade Register of China-Angola Arms Sales (2016-2020)71 
 
Economic Considerations in the Cases 
To create profit for supplying country 
In the nascent stages of its role as a major arms exporter, China’s profit received from 
international arms sales helped modernize the People’s Liberations Army (PLA).72  The PRC 
viewed this modernization as a critical aspect of China’s role as a world power in the years to 
come.73 However, in 1998, the 15th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party ordered 
the PLA to dissolve its military business complex and divest its equity in commercial enterprises, 
an important source of its revenue.74  According to Earl Conteh-Morgan and Patti Weeks, this 
 




72 Bitzinger, Richard. Chinese Arms Production and Sales to the Third World. Santa Monica, CA (P.O. Box 2138, 
Santa Monica 90407-2138): RAND, 1991. 
https://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.31822007678279 
73 Ibid. 
74 Crane, Keith, Roger Cliff, Evan Medieros, James Mulvenon, and William Overholt. Modernizing China's 
Military: Opportunities and Constraints. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2005. 
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divestment meant that the PLA could no longer receive profits from civilian ventures and now 
had to rely on arms sales.75  Therefore, markets in Africa are one way the PLA can “regain its 
lost domestic commercial profits via external commercial arms relationships.”76   
Updated and accessible information on China’s profit from its current arms sales to 
Sudan, Nigeria, and Angola is limited.  This inaccessibility is due to China’s “lack of 
transparency” regarding its arms sales.77  However, William Hartung found that “the revenues 
that China derives from sales to Sudan pale in comparison to the value of China’s exports of 
civilian goods and services.”78   
It is worth noting that a prominent feature of current Chinese weapons exports to Africa 
is their affordability.  China often offers large loans and low-cost financing options to purchasing 
countries.79  Specifically, Conteh-Morgan and Weeks note that the PRC makes arms “affordable 
to cash-poor countries through loans with very low interest rates.”80 
To encourage the sharing of non-military goods and services 
 Acquiring resources appears to be a frequent consideration of China’s engagement with 
sub-Saharan Africa. Similar to how the PRC makes its weapons affordable for developing 
countries through low-interest loans, the PRC also offers barter agreements and offset 
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arrangements to countries with abundant natural resources.81  These deals involve the exchange 
of weapons for rights to natural resources, such as oil access.82  
Resources play a large part in China’s relations with Sudan, specifically.  In need of 
increased oil reserves to accommodate its rapidly growing economy in the 1990s, China turned 
to foreign exporters.83  The China National Petroleum Company (CNPC) saw Sudan’s emerging 
oil industry as an opportunity for investment.84   The resulting oil cooperation between the two 
countries advanced their economic and political relations.  Therefore, much of the weapons sales 
to Sudan were to gain access to the country’s resources, particularly Sudanese oil supplies.85  
According to the Jamestown Foundation, its arms sales to Sudan “helps consolidate and protect 
Chinese investment in Sudan’s oil reserves.”86   
China’s “massive domestic demand for oil” also appears to be a consideration for its sales 
to Nigeria.87  Nigeria is the largest oil-producing country in Africa, and the commodity is a 
significant aspect of Sino-Nigerian relations.  For instance, in 2005, Nigeria’s government 
purchased $251 million worth of military aircraft from China following “a series of significant 
oil deals.”88  Angola is the second-largest oil-producing country in Africa, and, like in Sudan and 
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To create employment opportunities for supplying country 
 Several of the major Chinese arms-producing companies, such as the Aviation Industry 
Corporation of China (AVIC) and China North Industries Group Corporation Limited (also 
known as NORINCO), are state-owned enterprises (SEOs).  Much of their information on sales, 
specifically of weapons, is not available to the public.89  It is difficult to assess not only the 
current employment levels of these firms, but how many jobs have been created directly or 
indirectly as a result of weapons sales to Sudan, Nigeria, and Angola. 
 
Strategic Considerations in the Cases 
To create influence with recipient country 
 According to Raska and Bitzinger, China is “gradually positioning its arms exports as an 
instrument of its foreign policy to project presence, power, and influence in areas vital to its 
interests.”90  Elsewhere, Chinese arms sales have helped the country strengthen its relationship 
with several Middle Eastern countries, such as Iran and Syria.91  They have also helped the 
country to counter the influence of other nations.   For instance, Chinese arms sales to Pakistan 
are in part due to the PRC’s desire to prevent Indian regional hegemony in South Asia.92  In 
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traditionally dominated by Russian arms exports” while simultaneously “counterbalancing the 
influence of Western powers.”93   
When China first became a major exporter of global arms sales in the 1980s, it did so in 
the ideologically driven era of the Cold War.  At the time, Chinese weapons transfers to state and 
non-state actors intended to advance the communist political ideology.94  Currently, China no 
longer appears to utilize arms transfers to promote its political ideology, preferring to take a 
“relatively apolitical approach to arms sales in Africa.”95 Indra De Soysa and Paul Midford even 
found that “China relative to the United States transfers greater amounts of arms to democracies 
rather than autocracies.”96  
 According to Esther Pan, China attempts to use influence gained from arms sales to 
leverage its partners in Africa to assist the PRC in its strategic objectives, such as gaining allies 
in the United Nations.97  China can use these allies to help achieve its goals, such as “preventing 
Taiwanese independence and diverting attention from its own human rights record.”98   
 Take the support of China’s policies toward Xinjiang, for instance.  In 2019, two 
coalitions in the United Nations sent opposing letters specifying either support for or 
condemnation of China’s actions toward minorities in the Xinjiang region.  The former letter, 
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which proclaimed support for China, had 36 signatories.99   Sudan, Nigeria, and Angola were 
among these signatories.100 
 Sudan and Angola similarly sided with China over its handling of Hong Kong in 2020, 
including the signing of a new national security law that allows China to limit Hong Kong 
citizens’ political freedoms.101  Angola received a significant 42 million TIV shipment of 
Chinese weapons in 2020.102  While Sudan did not receive Chinese arms in 2020, it was the 
largest importer of the PRC’s weapons in sub-Saharan Africa over the previous five years.103  
Interestingly, Nigeria abstained from both a 2020 follow-up vote regarding Xinjiang and the 
Hong Kong vote that same year.104  This occurred despite Nigeria receiving a 57 million TIV 
arms shipment from China in 2020.105  However, Nigeria’s abstaining from the vote may have 
been due to a recent downturn in China-Nigeria relations stemming from a divisive commercial 
loan agreement between the two countries.106 
To assist allies and partners 
Sudan has long been a partner of China in Africa and has imported major Chinese 
weapons since 1968.107  The two countries first established diplomatic ties in 1959, and their 
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relationship developed noticeably throughout the reign of President Nimairi (1969-1985).108  
China began increasing its arms exports, eventually becoming one of the largest suppliers of 
weapons to Sudan in 1994.109  This increase in weapons imports was in part because of Sudan’s 
need for weapons during the Second Sudanese Civil War, as well as hopes for the “improved 
finances and enhanced international credit derived from its oil potential.”110  A report by the US-
based NGO Human Rights First found there to be a “clear linkage between Beijing’s controlling 
interest in Sudan’s oil industry and its substantial sale of the small arms being used by Khartoum 
to commit atrocities in Darfur.”111 
Relations between China and Nigeria formally began in 1971.  Since then, the two 
countries have become close allies and trading partners.  Nigeria first imported arms from China 
in 2010 and has grown to become the second-largest receiver of Chinese weapons in sub-Saharan 
Africa.  Recently, many of the weapons imports have been to assist the country in its fight 
against terrorist groups, such as the Boko Haram.  Among the weapons used for this purpose are 
the CH-3 armored UAV (drone), with China “seeking to be a first-tier exporter of such modern 
military systems.”112 
 
108 Large, Daniel. “Sudan's Foreign Relations With Asia: China and the Politics of 'Looking East'.” Publication – 
Center for Security Studies | ETH Zurich. Institute for Security Studies, February 2008. 
https://css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital-library/publications/publication.html/98943. 
109 Human Rights Watch. “Arms Transfers to the Government of Sudan.” Human Rights Watch. Accessed June 18, 
2021. https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports98/sudan/Sudarm988-05.htm. 
110 Human Rights Watch. “China's Involvement in Sudan: Arms and Oil.” Sudan, Oil, and Human Rights: China's 
Involvement in Sudan: Arms and Oil, November 2003. https://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/sudan1103/26.htm. 
111 Human Rights First. “New Report: China's Oil Interests In Sudan Fueling Darfur Violence.” Human Rights First. 
Accessed June 24, 2021. https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/2008/03/12/new-report-chinas-oil-interests-in-sudan-
fueling-darfur-violence. 
112 Singer, Jeffrey Lin and P.W. “It Looks Like An Armed Chinese-Made Drone Crashed In Nigeria.” Business 
Insider. Business Insider, January 29, 2015. https://www.businessinsider.com/it-looks-like-an-armed-chinese-made-
drone-crashed-in-nigeria-2015-1. 
   
 
 23 
Official relations between Angola and the PRC began in 1983.113  However, China was 
involved in the country before it gained its independence from Portugal in 1975.  China supplied 
weapons to the National Liberation Front of Angola (FLNA), a former insurgent group-turned 
political party.114  For instance, in 1974, the FLNA “received a 450-ton shipment of arms and 
benefited from the assistance of 112 Chinese instructors.”115  The two countries have remained 
close economic and political allies since. 
To establish security facilities in receiving countries 
None of the countries examined in this study have known Chinese military bases or 
facilities.  Djibouti possesses China’s sole military base on the African continent, and the country 
has imported relatively few arms from China (13 million TIVs cumulatively).116  Additionally, 
there are no known Chinese intelligence facilities in Sudan, Nigeria, and Angola. 
  
Discussion 
The cases indicate that China has both economic and strategic motivations for selling 
arms to sub-Saharan Africa.  This paper could not gather sufficient data on how much China 
profited financially from its individual arms sales to Sudan, Nigeria, and Angola, because that 
data is not publicly shared.  However, several reasons indicate that economic profit is likely not a 
primary motive of China with these arms sales.  First, China consistently offers generous 
financing options for its arms sales to poorer developing countries, of which all three cases are.  
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Conteh-Morgan and Weeks note that the PRC makes arms “affordable to cash-poor countries 
through loans with very low interest rates.”117  If profit were a significant motivator of its arms 
sales, the PRC would presumably not offer such affordability and financing to receiving 
countries and instead charge rates more comparable to competing countries.   
However, the data showed strong evidence of China selling arms to encourage the 
sharing of non-military goods and services.  This correlation mainly applies to the sharing of 
natural resources.  The transfer of arms to gain access to oil, especially, was evident in all three 
cases.  Conteh-Morgan and Weeks again note that China offers arms to “mineral-rich countries 
willing to grant access to natural resources in a quid pro quo arrangement for supplying 
weapons.”118  
This research was unable to adequately judge what effect arms sales to Sudan, Nigeria, 
and Angola had on employment opportunities in China.  This difficulty stemmed from two 
reasons.  First, Chinese civilian defense companies that produce weapons have other roles, 
making it impossible to assess the percentage of any employment increases directly attributed to 
the companies’ weapons exporting capabilities. AVIC alone has ten business segments, 
including “defense, transport aircraft, aviation engine, helicopters, avionics, general aviation 
aircraft, aviation research and development, flight test, trade & logistics, asset management.”119  
Moreover, AVIC and NORINCO produce and sell weapons to domestic markets in China and 
other non-African companies.  Therefore, drawing a direct correlation between arms sales to sub-
Saharan Africa and employment creation is again difficult. 
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Additionally, China’s lack of transparency, and the overall secretive aspect of many arms 
sales, meant that this study could not assess with high confidence any correlation.  For example, 
as of 2020, AVIC appears to have 417,798 employees.120  NORINCO appears to have 204,378 
employees.121  However, neither company specifies the proportion of those numbers in the 
defense industry aspect of their company, let alone the weapons producing segments. 
 The data indicates that China used its arms sales to these countries to gain influence.  
China intended to use this influence to leverage these countries to further its political objectives.  
The two specific UN agreements examined, those regarding China’s Xinjiang and Hong Kong 
policies, appeared to correlate with arms sales that same year.   
The data also appeared to corroborate the theory that countries sell arms to assist allies, as 
all three countries examined were close economic and political partners of the PRC.  Researcher 
Nan Tian argued that the “Blanket” style of China’s arms sales, which involves selling various 
types of weapons to a diverse set of countries, is inconsistent with the notion of targeted arms 
sales to achieve strategic objectives.122  Instead, he claimed that this is more indicative of arms 
deals made on a supply and demand basis (and therefore economically motivated).123  However, 
Byman and Cliff’s research opposes this argument and instead asserts that China abstains from 
selling to potential enemies, thereby suggesting the PRC is more motivated by strategic 
reasons.124  All three of the sub-Saharan African countries that receive the most arms from China 
are clear allies, supporting the latter conclusion. 
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There appeared to be no correlation between arms sales and gaining access to military or 
intelligence facilities in the receiving country.  None of the three countries assessed in this 
research had Chinese military bases. 
 
Conclusion 
 The literature review highlighted the various potential economic and strategic 
motivations for countries selling arms.  This paper concludes that both economic and strategic 
considerations motivate China’s arms sales in sub-Saharan Africa.  Of the three economic 
considerations examined, there was only a distinct correlation between China’s arms sales and 
the sharing of non-military goods and services (particularly the supply of resources).  Acquiring 
profit did not appear to be a key consideration.  The paper was unable to find a direct correlation 
between China’s arms transfers and increases in employment opportunities. 
 Of the three strategic considerations examined, this paper assesses that there is a 
correlation between the PRC’s arms sales and gaining influence.  Similarly, it found a correlation 
between China’s arms sales and assisting allies and partners.  There appeared to be no correlation 
between China’s arms sales and establishing military or intelligence facilities in the receiving 
country. 
Issues with data prevent this paper from drawing definitive conclusions about China’s 
arms transfers to sub-Saharan Africa.  However, the preponderance of available data indicated 
that China is likely motivated more by strategic considerations than economic considerations.  
This conclusion is consistent with the paper’s initial hypothesis that the PRC was primarily 
motivated by strategic reasons rather than economic reasons. 
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 The cases selected were likely not completely representative of all of sub-Saharan Africa.  
This underrepresentation is predominantly due to a lack of available and necessary data.  For 
instance, when examining each consideration in the cases, there was rarely sufficient data from 
each of the three countries.  Rather, one or two countries would have the necessary information, 
with the third not having the required amount.   
This issue with gathering data was likely for a few reasons, foremost being the relatively 
clandestine aspect of many arms transfers.  The secretive nature of arms sales, particularly from 
China, means that there is insufficient data to thoroughly examine every consideration in the 
cases.  China’s propensity to use misinformation when reporting on its foreign activities 
exacerbated this issue.  Publicly available information, like that used by the SIPRI to make its 
Arms Transfer Database, could therefore be erroneous.  China is known for its “lack of 
transparency” over the “volume of sales, [the] role of the central government therein, China’s 
export policies, and its enforcement of them.”125   
Additionally, the quantitative data utilized in this research study came predominantly 
from SIPRI, which, as mentioned before, only includes what it considers to be “major” 
weapons.126  As China is the largest small arms exporter to Africa, the numbers given in this 
study could be underrepresented.127  This could mean available data is an underrepresentation, or 
inaccurate representation, of the actual number of transfers.   
Policy implications and recommendations for areas of future research 
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 This research contributed to existing scholarship on China’s increasing engagement in 
Africa by adding to the debate on whether strategic or economic reasons drive the PRC’s arms 
transfers to sub-Saharan African countries.  While it could not make definitive conclusions due 
to issues with data, the data acquired through this paper’s methodology indicated that China is 
likely motivated more by strategic considerations.   
 By knowing China’s primary motivations for its arms sales to sub-Saharan Africa, US 
policymakers and others can better weigh decisions on how to counter the PRC on the African 
continent.  The transfer of major weapons systems, such as those discussed in this paper, can 
have significant regional impacts that influence the United States’ posture in the area.  Therefore, 
policymakers and others need to understand what drives that activity.  For instance, if the US 
knows that China’s arms transfers are driven more by strategic considerations over economic 
considerations, it may wish to take additional steps to counter.  Moreover, there may be benefits 
to knowing what we do not know.  The lack of available information on small arms and light 
weapons, for example, means that most recent research on China’s arms sales does not include a 
large segment of the arms industry.  It is important for consumers of information on China’s 
arms sales to be aware of this gap in available data. 
Future research that uses a different methodology may further this debate and advance 
the available information.  For instance, quantitative analysis examining the correlation between 
Chinese arms sales and one specific consideration could help increase confidence in that 
relationship.  This method could ameliorate the difficulty of assessing correlation from 
qualitative data alone.  Furthermore, research utilizing a different sampling frame, such as max-
variation, could further increase the available information on the subject.  Additional scholarship 
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that includes cases where China did not sell weapons too, per the Mills’ Joint Method of 
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